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Science and Rationality  
foR one and all
P.D. Magnus
a successful scientific community might require different scientists to form different 
beliefs even when faced with the same evidence. The standard line is that this would 
create a conflict between the demands of collective rationality which scientists face as 
members of the community and the demands of individual rationality which they face 
as epistemic agents. This is expressed both by philosophers of science (working on the 
distribution of cognitive labor) and by epistemologists (working on the epistemology 
of disagreement). The standard line fails to take into account the relation between ra-
tional belief and various epistemic risks, values of which are a matter of personal and 
social commitment. This introduces the possibility of conflicts the standard line does 
not recognize, because someone with extreme values might be individually rational but 
too far beyond the pale to have a place in the scientific community. More importantly, 
it introduces at least a possibility for good scientists to be rational individuals.
science would probably go best if individual scientists at least sometimes form differing beliefs even when faced with the same evidence. The standard line, both 
among philosophers of science and epistemologists, is that this creates a conflict be-
tween the demands of collective rationality which scientists face as members of the 
community and the demands of individual rationality which they face as epistemic 
agents. I argue that this conflict presumes an inadequate conception of individual ra-
tionality. When we take into account the relation between rational belief and the val-
ues of various risks, it is at least possible for good scientists to be rational individuals.
1. The Standard Line in Philosophy of Science
It seems obvious that a community of one thousand scientists working together 
to make discoveries and solve puzzles should arrange itself differently than would 
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one thousand scientist- hermits working independently. Because of limited time, 
resources, and attention, an independent scientist can explore only some of the 
possible approaches to a problem. Working alone, each hermit would explore the 
most promising approaches. They would needlessly duplicate the work of others 
and would be unlikely to develop approaches which look unpromising but really 
have tremendous potential. Contrariwise, a large community can more rigorously 
explore the space of possible approaches. Most scientists should work on the most 
promising approaches, but a smaller number can be committed to approaches that 
initially look less promising. Exploratory work can reveal if one of those initially 
unpromising approaches has unrealized potential, and more scientists can adopt it 
once its potential becomes more apparent.
This division of cognitive labor is an important feature of science. It is a cen-
tral theme in the work of Thomas Kuhn, who emphasized both the importance of 
a shared approach and the need for some scientists to look beyond it. This is his 
famous distinction between normal science (governed by a paradigm) and revolu-
tionary science (in which one paradigm is replaced by another). Kuhn (1977) calls 
this need to abide by shared commitments and also to innovate “the essential ten-
sion” in science. Importantly, he recognizes that this tension is not felt internally 
by every scientist. Instead, some explore wilder alternative approaches while most 
hew more closely to the dominant paradigm. He writes,
Most anomalies are resolved by normal means; most proposals for new 
theories do prove to be wrong. If all members of a community responded 
to each anomaly as a source of crisis or embraced each new theory ad-
vanced by a colleague, science would cease. If, on the other hand, no one 
reacted to anomalies or to brand- new theories in high- risk ways, there 
would be few or no revolutions. (2012: 185– 6)
What makes a novel approach appealing to a particular scientist cannot be its ob-
jective promise, because otherwise pursuing it would not seem to be a risk. Rather, 
a scientist might initially adopt an approach for personal or aesthetic reasons, and 
their work on it can reveal its potential. Kuhn writes, “If they had not quickly 
taken it up for highly individual reasons, the new candidate for paradigm might 
never have been sufficiently developed to attract the allegiance of the scientific 
community as a whole” (2012: 155).
Philip Kitcher develops this idea in a formal way, acknowledging “a large debt 
to the ideas and writings of Thomas Kuhn” (1990: 5). subsequent philosophers 
have both extended Kitcher’s formal model and developed others.1 I am not con-
cerned here with the technical details, but instead with the fact that many authors 
1. see recent surveys by Ryan Muldoon (2013) and Michael Weisberg (2010).
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in this tradition take it to involve an opposition between the epistemic demands 
of individual rationality which weigh on a scientist and the epistemic demands of 
collective rationality that weigh on the scientific community. For example, Kitch-
er claims that this work poses “a mismatch between the demands of individual 
rationality and those of collective (or community) rationality” (1990: 6). Kevin 
Zollman writes, “Looking at . . . scientists from the perspective of individualistic 
epistemology, one might be inclined to criticize the scientists’ behavior. However, 
when viewed as a community, their behavior becomes optimal” (2010: 33).
One may wonder whether these philosophers of science really think that sci-
ence puts the demands of responsible science in tension with the demands of in-
dividual rationality. Beyond brief passages like the ones that I have quoted, they 
do not whinge at length about it. This is not because they resolve the problem, 
however, but because they give up thinking about scientists as rational agents with 
full information.
Kitcher’s solution is to “dissolve the notion of rationality” (1993: 194, empha-
sis in original). On his view, we should not expect or enquire after whether scien-
tists are rational. Instead, we should ask only whether they employ strategies of 
belief formation which promote cognitive goals, recognizing that there are limits 
and conflicts involved in their doing so. In cases of science having functioned well, 
Kitcher writes, “society, nature, and sound individual reasoning combined to drive 
the social learning machine to a new success” (1993: 218). He demands sound rea-
soning not in the technical sense (valid with true premises) but just in the minimal 
sense of employing reliable- enough strategies to promote collective progress. This 
allows for scientists to use different strategies, to take different risks, and to draw 
different conclusions even from the same evidence.
Zollman skirts the problem in a different way. Instead of arguing that scien-
tists might responsibly draw different conclusions in the face of the same evidence, 
he models scientists as having limited information. In his models, the community 
structure of science limits which scientists share their findings with which others. 
Individuals react to different evidence and so may disagree, even though rational-
ity would not allow disagreement in the face of the same evidence.
2. The Standard Line in Epistemology
suppose we accept a roughly Kuhnian account of the distribution of cognitive 
labor. given the same evidence, some scientists pursue research which has P as a 
presupposition. a few scientists pursue research which has incompatible presup-
positions; to simplify the case, just suppose that the rival approach has ∼P as a 
presupposition. One might advise them all to believe neither P nor ∼P, to remain 
agnostic while guiding their research by one presupposition or the other. There are 
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reasons to think this would be bad advice. First, scientists who cultivate agnosti-
cism might not pursue their chosen research program with the necessary vigor. The 
community would then do better if those individuals fully embraced the presuppo-
sitions of their approach. second, there is some reason to think that any declared 
agnosticism would just be ersatz. a scientist whose research presumes P might 
never have occasion to act on anything but that presupposition. Their lab is outfit-
ted to pursue the P- presuming approach and they have filled it with P- presuming 
postdocs, after all, and one of the advantages of dividing cognitive labor is pre-
cisely that a scientist committed to that approach no longer needs to worry about 
the possibility of ∼P. arguably, this kind of practical commitment to P— acting as 
if P at every turn—is tantamount to belief that P.
although these reasons might be contested, I will accept without further argu-
ment that the collective rationality of the community requires each individual sci-
entist in this situation either to believe P or to believe ∼P. If the scientists are indi-
vidually rational, then rationality must allow agents in comparable circumstances 
to come to different beliefs; that is, epistemology must be permissive.
Many contemporary epistemologists deny this kind of permissiveness. For ex-
ample, Roger White (2005) argues against any epistemological account which al-
lows for agents in possession of the same evidence to reach different conclusions. 
anthony Brueckner and alex Bundy rebut White’s arguments but nevertheless ac-
cept what they call “the plausible ‘Pyrrhonian’ principle whereby one always ought 
to withhold judgment when one’s evidence equally favors a belief of P and a belief 
of ∼P  .  .  .” They add, “While Pyrrhonian skepticism may not be attractive, this 
principle certainly is” (2012: 166).2 The principle condemns at least some scientists 
as irrational if, in the face of the same evidence, some come to believe P and others 
to believe ∼P.
similar positions are common in the literature on the epistemology of disagree-
ment, where an epistemic peers’ belief that ∼P is taken to undercut one’s belief in 
P. according to the equal weight view, advocated by adam Elga (2007) and others, 
the peer’s belief that ∼P weighs against P just as much as one’s own reasons for P 
weigh in favor of it.3 David Christensen notes the tension between these responses 
to disagreement and the group- level strategies like the ones I discussed in the previ-
ous section. He writes,
It’s quite plausible that knowledge is best advanced by people exploring, 
and attempting to defend, a variety of answers to a given question. Perhaps, 
human psychology makes this easier to do when investigators actually have 
2. The Pyrrhonian skeptic appeals to the possibility of acting for all the world as if P while not 
believing P, a possibility which I set aside here.
3. Ruth Weintraub (2013) surveys and rebuts arguments against the possibility of rational dis-
agreement among epistemic peers.
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a lot of confidence in the hypotheses they’re trying to defend. Certain sorts 
of inquiry might well work best when a variety of investigators have irra-
tionally high levels of confidence in a variety of pet hypotheses. . . . . But I 
would argue that the patterns of belief are no more epistemically rational 
for all that. (2007: 215)
so Christensen insists that, from the standpoint of epistemology, scientists partici-
pating in the collective system would be irrational.
3. Putting It Together
The previous sections have pointed to an apparent tension between the demands 
of individual rationality and the demands of the scientific community. although 
this tension is recognized both by philosophers of science and by epistemologists, 
I want to argue that both sides are mistaken. scientists can responsibly participate 
in scientific communities.
The problem is that both sides presume that individual, epistemic rationality is 
just aimed at one univocal thing. The alternative is what I have elsewhere called the 
James- Rudner- Douglas or JRD thesis: “anytime a scientist announces a judgement 
of fact, they are making a tradeoff between the risk of different kinds of error. This 
balancing act depends on the costs of each kind of error, so scientific judgement 
involves assessments of the value of different outcomes” (Magnus 2013).
The label is taken from the name of three exponents of it across the last cen-
tury or so: William James, Richard Rudner, and Heather Douglas. James famously 
argues that we are subject to inconsistent epistemic demands. He writes, “Believe 
truth! shun error!—these, we see, are two materially different laws; and by choos-
ing between them we may end up coloring differently our whole intellectual life” 
(1948: 100). James argues that this opens up a space for belief in the absence of 
sufficient evidence. If my personal beliefs overextend in this way, I accept a greater 
risk of error but gain the chance of believing a truth which I otherwise would not 
have gotten to believe. He is primarily thinking of personal and religious matters, 
and argues simply that we should “respect one another’s mental freedom” (1948: 
109).4 Rudner (1953) makes a parallel argument for scientific claims, but hopes 
that the appropriate value judgments might be provided by an objective science 
of ethics. Douglas (2009) reiterates Rudner’s argument but without the dream of 
objective values. she recognizes that belief choice necessarily involves a balance 
between the risk of believing something false and the risk of failing to believe 
4. Weintraub (2013) invokes James to argue for the possibility of rational disagreement. Her 
primary focus is philosophical disputes, so she (like James) does not extend the result to scientific 
disagreement.
134 • P.D. Magnus
Ergo • vol. 1, no. 5 • 2014
something true—a balance which can only be struck by personal or social com-
mitments. she writes, “Within the parameters of available resources and methods, 
some choices must be made, and that choice should weigh the costs of false posi-
tives versus false negatives. Weighing these costs legitimately involves social, ethi-
cal, and cognitive values” (2009: 104).
If the evidence favors P, then one might still suppose that the only rational 
options are to believe P or to believe nothing. For example, Richard Foley (1993) 
invokes James in arguing for the possibility of rational disagreement but argues 
that personal commitment only sets a threshold of rational confidence that will 
suffice for belief. On this view, the JRD thesis just allows for some individuals to 
rationally believe while others are rationally agnostic. This fails to recognize the 
full force of the thesis. Commitments do more than define a single threshold to bal-
ance the value one might gain by believing truth against the cost one might pay for 
believing in error. Rather, different possible truths may offer different value, and 
different possible falsities may impose different costs. This allows for some people 
to rationally believe P and others to rationally believe ∼P.
Imagine a community of scientists who are arranged so as to have the best col-
lective distribution of their labor. In this community, the work of some scientists 
presupposes P, and the work of others presupposes Q which is incompatible with 
P. Moreover, presume that things will go best for science if the former scientists 
believe P (and ∼Q) while the latter believe Q (and ∼P). With the JRD thesis in 
mind, it becomes clear that agnosticism could make their personal epistemic situ-
ation worse too.
Consider a particular scientist—call her Jane—who believes P and structures 
her work around the assumption. The scientific evidence is suggestive but not en-
tirely decisive, and a more cautious scientist might be agnostic in precisely the 
same circumstances. Jane values believing a truth about the matter more highly 
than avoiding a false belief. More specifically, she values the possibility of believing 
P if it is true more than she is averse to having a false belief if P is false. another 
scientist—call her sarah—structures her work around the alternative approach. 
she values the possibility of believing Q if it is true more highly than the cost of 
falsely believing Q if it is false. since Q is incompatible with P, sarah misses out on 
the opportunity to believe P and is willing to accept the risk involved in believing 
∼P. It is rational for Jane to believe P and for sarah to believe ∼P.5 The demands 
that individual and collective rationality place on them coincide.
One might think that Jane and sarah are illicitly cutting corners. If a scientist 
5. a standard claim in the epistemology of disagreement is that finding rational, well- informed 
peers who have opposing beliefs should cause Jane to doubt her own belief. That could be made 
compatible with my claim here by denying that Jane and sarah are epistemic peers because they as-
sign different values to the risks and benefits involved, although ‘epistemic peer’ is not usually defined 
in this way.
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has any business believing P or Q, then evidence and overwhelming reasons will 
eventually be uncovered. Yet no evidence is ever absolutely overwhelming, and 
evidence which would generally be taken as convincing might not be uncovered 
until after they are dead.6 For each scientist, agnosticism would guard against the 
danger of her having a false belief. However, it increases the chance that she will 
never end up believing the truth. The JRD thesis means that both are legitimate 
epistemic considerations for her.
note that the JRD thesis only provides what Douglas calls an indirect role for 
values, one which turns on “the sufficiency of evidence, the weighing of uncertain-
ty, and the consequences of error” (2009: 103). The values that enter into Jane’s 
believing P are the benefit of believing P if P is true, the cost of not believing P if P 
is true, the benefit of not believing P if P is false, and the cost of believing P if P is 
false. These are precisely the benefits of accuracy and the cost of error. There is no 
place for how much she would value unconditionally believing P (regardless of its 
truth) or how much she would value P being the case. Deciding belief based on the 
latter values would just be wishful thinking.7
One might still worry that the JRD thesis opens the door to madness. since 
there is nothing in this argument which depends on the content of P, a hypotheti-
cal Jane can be posed for any belief whatsoever. someone with a crazy array of 
value commitments can rationally come to have crazy beliefs. However, a parallel 
possibility arises for any theory of rationality, because someone who believes crazy 
premises can rationally derive crazy conclusions from them. The informal solution, 
the path for avoiding madness, is to eschew crazy beliefs and crazy value commit-
ments. There is no formal test for craziness, of course, but this is true as much for 
beliefs as for commitments.
Moreover, there are some qualitative constraints which arise especially for the 
scientific case. as Kuhn points out, some commitments would be tantamount to 
giving up science altogether (Kuhn 2012: e.g. 79). so the socially- defined bounds 
of science can give us some implicit guidance in distinguishing legitimate disagree-
ment from craziness. although I do not claim this to be exhaustive, let’s briefly 
consider two kinds of constraint.
First, few scientific examples pose choices between P and ∼P. Instead they pose 
a choice between incompatible but non- exhaustive options like P and Q. There are 
indefinitely many other possibilities which have no scientific plausibility whatsoever. 
any commitments which were sufficient to lead to Jane’s believing unscientific R 
would be sufficient to make her not a scientist anymore. It may be that sometimes 
6. They can even have good reason to think that they will not live to see the evidence, if they are 
old and part of a long- term research program.
7. some authors argue for a broader or direct role for commitments in deciding belief. For ex-
ample, Biddle (2013) suggests that arguments from underdetermination, if they make any place for 
values in scientific inference, would ultimately make a place for any contextual factors whatsoever.
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the range of possible commitments a scientist might have and still be a scientist is 
narrow enough to rule out any freedom to believe. For Kuhn, the possibility of hew-
ing to something besides the dominant paradigm only opens in time of crisis.
second, a scientist must be honest about the evidence. as the research guided 
by P fails to progress and becomes weighed down by anomalies, there is no deter-
minate point at which reason demands that Jane give up either the research or her 
belief in P. However, she ought not pretend there is progress when there is not or 
deny that there are anomalies. Her commitments give her freedom to dispute the 
significance of these things but not their existence. as Imre Lakatos insists, there is 
scope within rationality both for “pigheadedness” and “modesty” in pursuing rival 
research programs (1978: 113). He writes, “One may rationally stick to a degen-
erating research programme until it is overtaken by a rival and even after. What 
one must not do is to deny its poor public record” (1978: 117). some value com-
mitments would make it difficult or impossible for Jane to even recognize salient 
evidence, and those commitments would make her scientifically beyond the pale.
4. Taking It Apart
The previous section concluded with the idea that there are nonformal constraints 
on what value commitments scientists can have qua scientists. The constraints are 
fallible, defeasible, historical products, just like all the structure of science.
This makes for a possibility that seems not to have been noticed in the exist-
ing literature: at some point in the history of science, there could be premises or 
commitments which are scientifically out of bounds but which would not count 
as crazy by the standards of individual epistemology. so the commitments of some 
individuals might allow them to be individually rational while making them un-
able to count as scientists—a fortiori making them unable to meet the demands of 
collective rationality as part of the scientific community.
The standard line, discussed above, is that collective rationality might require 
more disagreement than individual rationality can allow. The point here is the re-
verse: given particular constraints and commitments at a time, collective rational-
ity might allow less disagreement than individual rationality requires.
To make this concrete, consider the search for extraterrestrial intelligence (sETI). 
Let P be the proposition that there is intelligent life on some other world which could 
be detected by a systematic sETI project. Direct evidence for P is lacking. One indirect 
argument relies on the Drake Equation, a formula which calculates the number of 
detectable civilizations from the total number of stars which could support life, the 
fraction of those which will have planets that could support life, the fraction of those 
which actually have life on them, and so on. Every term in the equation is subject to 
considerable uncertainty, making it reasonable to be agnostic about P. However, it is 
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plausible to think that sETI would be pursued with greater vigor and ingenuity by 
scientists who believe P. since alleged alien signals should not be accepted too readily, 
it would be good to have some scientists who believe ∼P and who would subject the 
signals to critical, sceptical scrutiny. so the community might maximize its chances of 
identifying alien civilizations (if there are any) by having some members who already 
think that there are (or probably are) such civilizations and others who already think 
that there are (or probably are) none. If individual rationality required scientists to 
be agnostic—or even if it just required them all to come to the same conclusion on 
the basis of available evidence—then there would be a conflict between the epistemic 
good of the scientific community and the individual rationality of scientists. The force 
of the JRD thesis is that such a conflict can be avoided. Enthusiast scientists would be 
rational if they saw more positive value in correctly believing P (if it is true) than they 
saw negative value in wrongly believing P (if it is false). Cynical scientists would be 
rational if their values were the reverse of that.8
Other cases of scientific controversy might have this same structure. For ex-
ample, reasonable scientists disagreed about heliocentrism in the time after Coper-
nicus but before Kepler. It is a historical question whether they did so because of 
disagreement about values and costs and so were rational due to considerations I 
have discussed here, or whether they disagreed for other reasons. One might worry 
that, because heliocentrism is logically contingent, the JRD thesis entails that there 
is a possible array of values such that if someone held them today then it would be 
rational for that person to reject heliocentrism—but surely no responsible scientist 
today could be a geocentrist! This just illustrates that some values would be crazily 
extreme. a present- day geocentrist might obey the demands of individual rational-
ity but, because they could not be a responsible member of the astronomical com-
munity, would violate the demands of collective rationality.
since the requirements of individual and collective rationality are logically in-
dependent, there can be no a priori guarantee that their demands will harmonious-
ly align. Whether conflict or harmony is realized depends on the structure of the 
community, the state of science, and the value commitments of would- be scientists.
What I hope to have shown, contra the standard line, is that conflict is not in-
evitable. The space opened by the JRD thesis makes it possible for scientists to obey 
individual rationality while participating in collectively rational arrangements.
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